


Nash Equilibrium



"THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA" IS A CONCEPT FROM THE FIELD OF GAME THEORY.



IMAGINE TWO PERFECTLY RATIONAL PRISONERS WHO DON'T KNOW WHAT THE OTHER IS DOING. EACH CAN RAT OUT THE OTHER OR REMAIN SILENT, RESULTING IN 4 POSSIBLE OUTCOMES:

		RAT OUT	REMAIN SILENT
RAT OUT	 Both get 1 year.	 1 goes free. 2 gets 5 years.	
REMAIN SILENT	 2 goes free. 1 gets 5 years.	 Both get six months.	

IF YOU SQUEAL, YOU GET EITHER 1 OR 0 YEARS. IF YOU KEEP MUM, IT'S 5 OR 0.5 YEARS.

SO EVEN THOUGH D IS THE BEST CHOICE, THE "PERFECTLY RATIONAL" PEOPLE PICK A!

On the website of Princeton University, where Nash worked, the Nash equilibrium definition sounds like this:

Nash equilibrium ((game theory) a stable state of a system that involves several interacting participants in which no participant can gain by a change of strategy as long as all the other participants remain unchanged) [13].

Nash was the first to prove that such equilibria must exist for all finite games with any number of players. This was done in his 1950 dissertation on non-cooperative games. [14]

Today it is the most popular principle of rational behavior in the theory of non-cooperative games.

Suppose (S, H) is a noncooperative n -player game in normal form, where S is a set of pure strategies and H is a set of payoffs.

When each player

$$i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$$

chooses a strategy

$$x_i \in S$$

in the profile of strategies

$$x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

gets a prize of

$$H_i(x)$$

The payoff depends on the entire strategy profile: not only on the strategy

x_i , but also on other people's strategies

x_{-i} that is, all strategies x_j for $j \neq i$.

The strategy profile

$$x^* \in S$$

is a Nash equilibrium if you change your strategy from x_i^* on x_i is not beneficial to any player i , that is, for any i

$$H_i(x^*) \geq H_i(x_i, x_{-i}^*).$$

The most popular example of explaining the Nash equilibrium is the prisoner's dilemma. players 1 and player 2 $i \in \{1, 2\}$

suspected of committing a serious crime, are isolated from each other in pre-trial detention. In the absence of direct evidence, the success or failure of the prosecution depends on recognition (strategy 1) or non-recognition (strategy 2) of the bandits themselves. If both bandits confess (situation (1,1)), then they will found guilty and sentenced to 8 years in prison.

For player1 - i=1 (see Figure 3).

	$H_2(x)$	<i>Player 2</i>	Recognition;	Non-recognition;
$H_1(x)$				
<i>Player 1</i>			1	2
Recognition;	1		-8	0
Non-recognition;	2		-10	-1

Figure 3. Matrix for i=1

For i=2 (see Figure 4).

	$H_2(x)$	<i>Player 2</i>	Recognition;	Non-recognition;
$H_1(x)$				

<i>Player 1</i>		1	2
Recognition;	1	-8	-10
Non-recognition;	2	0	-1

Figure 4. Matrix for i=2

If none of them is not recognized (situation (2.2)), then on charges of the main they will be acquitted of the crime, but the prosecutor will still succeed prove their guilt in some concomitant less serious a crime, such as carrying a weapon, as a result of which they will be sentenced to 1 year in prison.

	$H_2(x)$	<i>Player 2</i>	Recognition;	Non-recognition;
$H_1(x)$				
<i>Player 1</i>			1	2
Recognition;	1		-8	-10
			-8	0
Non-recognition;	2		0	-1
			-10	-1

	$H_2(x)$	<i>Player 2</i>	Recognition;	Non-recognition;
$H_1(x)$				
<i>Player 1</i>			1	2
Recognition;	1		-8	-10

		-8	0
Non-recognition;	2	0	-1
		-10	-1

Figure 5. Matrix for both players i=1 and i=2

If finally confessed only one of them (situations (2,1) and (1,2)), then the admitted will be released (for helping the investigation), and the unrecognized person will be sentenced to a maximum term of 10 years.

For player 1 (i=1) – see Fig. 6.

$$H_1(x_1^*, x_2^*) \geq H_1(x_1, x_2^*)$$

$H_2(x)$	<i>Player 2</i>	Recognition;	Non-recognition;
$H_1(x)$			
<i>Player 1</i>		1	2
Recognition;	1	-8*	0
Non-recognition;	2	-10	-1

Figure 16. Possible moves for **Player 1**


$H_2(x)$	<i>Player 2</i>	Recognition;	Non- recognition;
$H_1(x)$			
<i>Player 1</i>		1	2
Recognition;	1	-8* 	-10
Non- recognition;	2	0	-1

Figure 7. Possible moves for **Player 2**

For player 2 $i=2$ – see Fig. 7.

$$H_1(x_2^*, x_1^*) \geq H_1(x_2, x_1^*)$$

i.e.

$$H_i(x_i^*, x_{-i}^*) \geq H_i(x_i, x_{-i}^*).$$

**** => Nash equilibrium**


		Player 2	
	H ₂ (x)	Recognition;	Non-recognition;
H ₁ (x)			
Player 1		1	2
Recognition;	1	-8*	0
Non-recognition;	2	-10	-1

-1-1
Pareto
Optimality


Figure 8. Nash equilibrium vs Pareto optimality


Steps.

- 0) Create folder for next lab
- 1) From Visual Studio Open WebSite from that folder



2) Add Default.aspx form






3) Add a button and 2 labels to the form

```
<asp:Button ID="Button1" runat="server" Text="Test" OnClick="Button1_Click" /><br />
<table>
  <tr>
    <td>
      Person:
    </td>
    <td>
      Crime:
    </td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>
      <asp:Label ID="LabelPerson" runat="server" Text="Label"></asp:Label>
    </td>
    <td>
      <asp:Label ID="LabelCrime" runat="server" Text="Label"></asp:Label>
    </td>
  </tr>
</table>
```



4) Open the file with C# code and add the definition of the Person class there



```
class Person
{
}
```

5) Add a method `AdmitGuilty()` to the class - which randomly gives the values true and false (50% by 50%)

```

class Person
{
static internal Random r = new Random();

internal bool AdmitGuilty()
{
    int x = r.Next(0, 100);
    if (x > 50) return true;
    return false;
}
}

```

6) Adding the Crime class - for a person who decides to become outlaw person

```

class Crime
{
    internal Person person;
    internal bool m; // status as a man of honor
    internal bool penito;

    internal Crime(Person p)
    {
        person = p;
    }

    public void Delete()
    {
        this.m = false; //deprivation of the status of a person of honor and the acquisition of the status of penito
        this.penito = true; // acquisition of the status of penito
    }
}

```

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8q7ZoB654P0&t=296s>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8q7ZoB654P0&t=347s>

```

internal bool RatOut() //analog AdmitGuilty()
{
    int x = (new Random()).Next(0, 100);//r.Next(0, 100);
}

```

```

    if (m)
    {
        if (x > 90) return true; // "People of honor" (members of the crime ring) have a higher recognition threshold - 90% versus 50% of a common person
    }
    return false;
}
}

```

7) Add a class `CrimeRing` to creation a criminal community (anthropological association)

```

class CrimeRing //class Crime Ring
{
    private Crime[] gang = new Crime[10];
    public Crime this[int i]
    {
        get
        {
            return gang[i];
        }
        set
        {
            gang[i] = value;
            gang[i].m = true;
        }
    }
}
}

```

```

protected void Button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e)
{
    Person orange = new Person();
    Person pink = new Person();

```

CrimeRing camorra = new CrimeRing(); // Reservoir Dogs - <https://youtu.be/1mxQaEZKbP0?t=92>

```
camorra[0] = new Crime(orange);
```



```
camorra[1] = new Crime(pink);
```



```
//
```

```
// Assessing the probability of recognizing usual people
```

```
LabelPerson.Text = " " + orange.AdmitGuilty() + "<br>" + pink.AdmitGuilty();
```

```
// Assessing the probability of recognizing members of the crime ring "man of honor"
```

```
LabelCrime.Text = " " + camorra[0].RatOut() + "<br>" + camorra[1].RatOut();
```

```
}
```